Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050
4.1. Scenario 1: Leopard
4.1.1. Global Story
Gross Domestic Product
In this scenario, most regions see slower economic growth compared with recent years, due to a lack of coordination, inadequate physical and institutional infrastructure, and a high degree of uncertainty - all unfavourable in general to private investment. Research and development, as well as technology transfer, are relatively constrained compared with today. Economic growth improves first in North America (around 2035), while Latin America and the Caribbean see improvements possibly only late in the period. There is a high degree of uncertainty about the future economy in Europe, centred on differing perceptions in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia. Most African countries see their economic growth decreasing due to inadequate governmental policies related to energy-capacity development, electricity and water development, and non-energy infrastructures (roads, telecommunications, health, and education), and declining investment from within the country or from outside investors. North America still sees its economy growing, albeit initially at a slower rate than today, and then increasing its rate of growth later in the study period, driven primarily by the United States. Asia does not see the situation depicted in this scenario as positive, and the lack of proactive government or international strategic interventions make it impossibly difficult to secure necessary energy resources.
Global population growth maintains its present trends. Asia, the dominant contributor to population growth today, sees an annual growth rate of 0.8%, resulting in a population increase from 3.9 billion today to somewhat more than 5 billion in 2050. The IEA WEO2007 predicts China's population to reach only 1.46 billion in 2030 from 1.31 billion today, while India's is predicted to grow "much more quickly and reach the overall level of China by 2030" . In Africa, little change from the present growth rate of 2.2 % is noted until 2035 when the population growth rate decreases due to a slowing of economic growth, a decrease in living standards, and the general expansion of poverty. The decline is contrary to the usually expected case because there is increasingly an emancipation of women. In Latin America, the current population growth rate of 1.9% decreases until 2020 and then remains constant to 2050 without active government measures to control birth rates and overall mortality rates increase with respect to present levels. North America sees its already decreasing growth rates persisting out to 2050. Europe is already experiencing a downward trend with several countries having negative growth rates.
Africa and Latin America see energy intensity increasing because of a deteriorating energy infrastructure combined with limited global cooperation and little local or international investment. Asia is generally more optimistic about this scenario and believes existing trends will continue to drive down energy intensity, and this occurs at an average annual rate of about -0.8% to 2050. The IEA WEO2007 focus on China and India indicates energy intensity continuing to fall in India and resuming a decline in China after increasing earlier in this decade . North America and Europe see new technologies introduced regardless of the constraints in this scenario and intensities continue to be reduced, although at rates lower than in the other scenarios.
The mathematical model shows global energy intensities decreasing by more than 20% by 2020, about 30% by 2035, and over 35% by 2050, compared with 9.7 MJ/$ppp in 2005 (see Figure 4-1 ).
Asia and Europe see the mix of energy technologies as unchanging from today throughout the period to 2050 because of weak incentives and as countries look inward. The IEA WEO2007 reference scenario sees continuing growth in all fuels except for biomass and waste, while China's coal demand, with a significant coal to liquids market, is seen as growing as fast as TPER, keeping the share of coal constant . Africa is pessimistic and sees the inward looking aspects implying that countries focus only on existing energy within their borders. Latin America also sees a decrease because of the difficulty of attracting significant capital outlays demanded by large projects. North America is optimistic that the diversification of energy sources will continue, emphasising the introduction of low carbon technologies.
With the exception of North America, the early demand for energy (2020) in other regions, driven mostly by population increase, results in an increase in the growth of overall energy requirements. In some cases (e.g., Africa), an increase in energy intensity exacerbates this trend. North America sees a correlation with economic growth, and when combined with declines in energy intensity, TPER remains at current levels.
The model shows primary energy (modern) production in this scenario increasing over that of today by 35% in 2020, 65% in 2035, and doubling by 2050 (see Figure 4-2 ). TPER levels in 2005 were just under 500 EJ. The IEA WEO2007 reference scenario shows China's and India's primary energy needs alone doubling by 2030, results that are consistent with this study, bearing in mind that the growth rate in other countries will be lower.
Greenhouse gas emissions increase in all regions initially and decrease only in later periods, first in Europe and then in the Americas - in the former with the introduction of significantly more hydropower, and in the latter with more non-carbon-emitting sources of electricity.
By comparison, the quantitative results from the model indicate CO2 emissions increasing between 30-40% in 2020, over 70% in 2035, and nearly 90% in 2050 (see Figure 4-3 ).
Oil. Tension increases in all cases except near 2050 in North America and Europe due to the introduction of new oil production technologies.
Tension increases everywhere but becomes neutral in Asia and North America between 2035 and 2050 as new exploration technologies are introduced.
For the most part, all regions see present trends continuing, supported by ample supplies; however, Africa and Latin America see immediate increases followed by stabilisation.
Without strong government involvement, study participants see the current uncertainty and ambivalence continuing, with a slight increase in tension in Europe due to increased demand.
Without government engagement, all regions (with the exception of Africa, where an imbalance is due to low international cooperation) see present trends continuing. In North America there is the possibility of a gap between demand and supply after 2035. Renewable energy from wastes (wood waste and sawdust, sugar-cane bagasse, rice straw, municipal waste) should increase since their utilisation involves neither high technology nor large capital investments.
The results here are mixed, with Africa seeing an increase due to more poverty and dwindling forests. This is not considered an issue in North America today and is not expected to be so in the future.
4.1.2. Winners, Losers, and Dilemmas
In a relative sense, oil and coal suppliers fare better in this scenario, because without cooperation and government engagement, there are likely to be fewer regulations aimed at increasing fuel security or reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Correspondingly, achieving the 3 A goals is likely to suffer, including reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Because government is an essential player in any nuclear power renaissance, this is less likely to happen and on a relatively smaller scale if it does. Finally, lower cooperation and integration internationally has a negative effect on international finance and investment, particularly in energy systems and products.
The major dilemma in this scenario is the limited policy instruments or partnership opportunities to address the negative outcomes. It is likely the situation could become unstable and major disruptions in the energy sector could result, affecting entire economies.